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ABSTRACT 
Executive pay is a major issue in the corporate governance debate. As well in 
practice as in theory debate still exists how executive pay levels and structures can be 
explained. This paper provides an overview of 16 theories that have been used in the 
literature to explain the phenomenon. The theories can be classified into three types 
of approaches; 1) the value approach; 2) the agency approach; and 3) the symbolic 
approach. A critical assessment of the theories shows that the dominant use in the 
literature of the perfect contracting approach of agency theory neglects: 1) the 
socially determined symbolic value that executive pay could represent, and 2) the 
contextual conditions under which executive pay is set. A more conclusive 
understanding of executive pay would be based on considering executive pay as an 
outcome of socially constructed corporate governance arrangements in which the 
actors involved have considerable discretion to influence the outcomes. Incorporating 
such a view in attempts to explain executive pay provides a more conclusive 
explanation of the recurrent debate on executive pay in theory and practice. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is hardly any other aspect of business life that catches the newspaper headlines 
as much as executive pay. Almost every day, the media display outrage about the 
tremendous heights that executive salaries, bonuses and other financial gratuities have 
reached. Amidst all this turmoil, boards of directors still have problems explaining 
how, how much, and why they pay their executives as they do.  
Not only in practice but also in theory the debate on what determines executive pay 
levels and structures is still ongoing. Although many different theories can and are 
used to explain executive pay, the field is still dominated by the perfect contracting 
approach of agency theory as introduced by Jensen and Meckling (1976). This 
“official story” on executive pay (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004) holds that executive pay 
is an instrument to alleviate agency problems. To render the separation between firm 
ownership and firm control harmless, the wide spread story told is that executive pay 
is an instrument to align the interests between shareholders and management 
(Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). Based on arguments of market forces and behavioral 
assumptions of actors risk preferences, pay setting is “simply” seen as a matter of 
optimal pay design (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 1997). Market forces are assumed to 
lead to optimal pay levels and structures, compensating executives for the risks they 
are willing to take to manage the corporation in the best interests of its shareholders 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Jensen and Murphy, 1990b). It may come then as no 
surprise that one of the most studied relationships in the executive pay literature is the 
relationship between pay and firm performance (Gomez-Mejia, 1994; Barkema and 
Gomez-Mejia, 1998). After all, an observable positive pay-performance link would 
show that executive’s risk taking behavior can be influenced by incentives. Thereby, 
given conditions of imperfect monitoring in practice it would  show that shareholders 
are able to write efficient contracts that align their interests with that of management.  
As can be expected with literally thousands of empirical studies in search for pay-
performance linkages empirical results are mixed. The results of these studies range 
from no significant relationships, to positive and negative relationships (See Tosi et. 
al. (2000) for an extensive overview of empirical studies). Although (methodological) 
debates about the strength and implications of the relationship are ongoing, the overall 
consensus seems to be that pay-performance relationships are not very strong 
(Conyon, Gregg and Machin, 1995; Gomez-Mejia, 1994; Gomez-Mejia and 
  
 
 
 
 
4
Wiseman, 1997; Jensen and Murphy, 1990b; 2004; Murphy, 1999; Rosen, 1990; Tosi 
et al 2000).  
These results weakens the case for the dominant use of the perfect contracting 
approach of agency theory for two reasons. First, the theory can only furnish weak 
explanations of the observable pay arrangements in practice. Its theoretical 
applicability could somehow be limited in the sense that incentives lead to other 
outcomes (in theory and/or practice). The effectiveness of incentives could be 
influenced by factors or theoretical assumptions that are not considered by the theory. 
And, second, actors involved in the pay setting process may in practice simply choose 
not to adhere to agency theory’s prescriptions or are not able to do so. The theory’s 
neo-classical economic assumptions of given and stable risk preferences, rational 
maximizing behavior of the actors, exclusion of chronic information problems 
(Hodgson, 1998) and focus on attained or movements to an “unique optimal that is 
guaranteed to be achieved” (March and Olson, 1984: 737),  may in practice simply 
not hold to provide conclusive explanations of executive pay.  
The dominant use of this single theory to explain executive pay leads us into a 
“blind alley” (Barkema and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). As Bebchuk and Fried (2004) 
argue, scholars often come up with clever explanations for pay practices that appear to 
be inconsistent with the dominant approach. “Practices for which no explanation has 
been found have been considered “anomalies” or “puzzles” that will ultimately either 
be explained within the paradigm or disappear” (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004, p3). As a 
consequence other potentially more fruitful approaches to explain executive pay have 
received much less attention. Largely overlooked in most of the executive pay 
literature, is that (implications of) theories and the determinants derived from these 
theories not only provide theoretical explanations of executive pay but also provide 
forms of legitimization for what is actually paid in practice (cf. Gomez-Mejia and 
Wiseman, 1997; Wade, Porac, and Pollock, 1997; Zajac and Westphal, 1995). Where 
some of the theories are rooted in economic theory and consider executive pay mainly 
as the result of market forces, other theories tend to focus much more on the 
contextual conditions under which actual decisions on pay are made. These theories 
tend to focus more on the socially constructed symbolic value that executive pay 
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could represent. The use of positive (economic) theories to settle debates in practice 
seem to get a normative bend when empirical results disconfirm the theory or when 
the theories are unable to provide conclusive or satisfactory explanations of the 
phenomenon in the public eye. For instance, the most often hypothesized relationship 
between pay and performance and the overall weak relationship found in empirical 
tests seem to fuel debates in practice. Especially in cases where executive pay rises 
and where firms show bad performance results or have to downsize, the general 
public seem to consider it a matter of fairness that pay should be (more) related to 
firm performance (cf. Gomez-Mejia, 1994; Jensen and Murphy, 2004; Murphy, 
1997). The in practice also widely debated seemingly high pay levels and high option 
grants to executives and the (growing) differences between pay levels at the top and 
lower level employees seem simply to be widely perceived as unfair (cf. Conyon and 
Murphy, 2000; Core, Guay, and Larcker, 2005; Kolb, 2006).    
To advance our understanding of executive pay and to find a way out of the blind 
alley of a single dominant approach, this paper provides an overview of the state of 
the art in theorizing executive pay. Besides the dominant perfect contracting approach 
of agency theory, 15 other theories are discussed. The theories are categorized in three 
types of approaches. 1) The value approach, comprising of theories that focus on the 
question how much to pay; 2) the agency approach, comprising of theories that focus 
more on the question how to pay; and 3) the symbolic approach, comprising of 
theories that focus more on the question what executives “ought” to be paid.  
Despite the many (fundamental) differences between the theories, the assessments of 
the theories and the sketched current state of the literature as advanced here give rise 
to signs of convergence in theorizing about executive pay. Observing executive pay is 
more and more considered to be an observation of the fundamental governance 
processes in an organization (cf. Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1995). Thereby, the pay 
setting process and the result of this process in given pay levels and structures are 
increasingly seen to have implications for and be influenced by socially constructed 
(national) corporate governance arrangements, organizational processes, and to have 
implications for executive motivation and motivation for lower level employees (c.f. 
Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Bratton, 2005; Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Finkelstein and 
Hambrick 1988; 1989; Gomez-Mejia, 1994; Jensen and Murphy, 2004; Rosen, 1986; 
Ungson and Steers, 1984). 
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It is argued here that further theorizing and any future attempt to explain what is truly 
going on in the world of executive pay should more be focused on all mechanisms 
that actually shape executive pay. Following Elster (1989:3): “[E]xplaining events is 
logically prior to explaining facts.” To unravel all of the “nuts and bolts” (Elster, 
1989) of executive pay, logical more fruitful explanations thus focus much more on 
the actual decision making process in which pay is set, rather than finding 
explanations of pay it self. The here sketched state of the art of the executive pay 
literature reveals at least three major implications for our understanding of executive 
pay and for further theory development. In contrast to the dominant approach it is 
argued that: 1) executive pay is not merely a “tool” to align interests between 
shareholders and executives, but is much more an outcome of pay setting practices; 
(2) the actors involved in these pay setting practices have considerable discretion not 
only to influence their own pay or the pay of others, but also have discretion to 
influence the development and workings of the mechanisms of these practices; and (3) 
pay setting practices cannot be fully understood without a thorough understanding of 
the implications of socially constructed corporate governance arrangements.  
 
 
THEORETICAL APPROACHES 
Extending previous overviews by Gomez-Mejia (1994) and Balsam (2002), the 16 
theories that are addressed here are categorized into three approaches. The 
classification is based on the main role that pay plays in a specific theory and on the 
underlying legitimizing arguments/ mechanisms of pay within a given theory. The 
three approaches are labeled respectively as: 1) The value approach, which focuses 
mainly on the question how much to pay executives. Executive pay is legitimized here 
by arguing that pay is set by market forces and pay is mainly regarded as the market 
value of executive services. 2) The agency approach considers pay mainly as a 
consequence of agency problems, and focuses on the question as to how to pay 
executives. Legitimizations of pay levels and structures are based on arguments of 
market forces and conceptions of executive pay at risk. And 3) the symbolic approach 
considers pay as a reflection of expectations, status, dignity or achievements, and 
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plays a more secondary role in executive motivation. The arguments used to 
legitimize executive pay are based on social constructed beliefs about the implications 
of being in an executive position. The approach deals mainly with the question of how 
socially constructed beliefs influence what pay ought to reflect. Table 1 provides an 
overview of the 16 different theories and their classification according to the three 
streams of thought.  
Following Machlup (1978: 496 as cited in Koppl, 2000: 595), theoretical “rules of 
procedures” cannot be termed “true” or “false”; they are either useful or not useful 
and are empirically meaningful (Koppl, 2000; see also North, 1990). As with most 
classifications, a tendency exists to oversimplify. Theories in general can be 
contradictory and complementary at the same time. This seems especially true for 
theories used in the executive pay literature (cf. Gomez-Mejia, 1994; Gomez-Mejia 
and Wiseman, 1997). Some theories could be classified within a certain approach as 
indicated by table 1, but may be complementary or based on theoretical principles 
from a theory classified in the same or another approach. Nevertheless, and keeping 
these points in mind, classifications are based on the underlying legitimizing 
arguments of specific pay levels and structures and are based on the main role that 
pay plays within the theory. 
As can be seen in table 1, the first cluster of 5 theories are categorized in the value 
approach. The agency approach, the second cluster of theories, consist of 2 groups, 
each comprised of 2 theories. The distinction between these two groups is made 
between (group 1) theories that argue that pay design is a (partial) solution to agency 
problems and (group 2) theories that argue that pay setting is influenced by executive 
discretion and that therefore executive pay is not a solution to agency problems, but 
rather an agency problem in itself. The third and last cluster, comprised of 7 theories, 
makes up the symbolic approach. The table reports the fundamental role that 
executive pay plays in all 16 different theoretical approaches. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 here 
---------------------------------------- 
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THE VALUE APPROACH  
The value approach generally regards pay as the reflection of the market value of an 
executive’s services. This approach uses the laws of economics of supply and demand 
as determinant factors for executive pay. Legitimizing executive pay is grounded in 
arguments of market forces and market mechanisms. The value approach consists of 
the following five different theories: 1) marginal productivity theory, 2) efficiency 
wage theory, 3) human capital theory, 4) opportunity cost theory, and 5) superstar 
theory.   
 
Within this value approach, the marginal productivity theory is presumably the most 
fundamental theory. The input from executives, i.e. the services they provide to the 
firm, is treated as any other input factor of production (e.g. Roberts, 1956). The value 
of this input is equal to the intersection of supply and demand on the labor market for 
executives. In this equilibrium pay is equal to the executive’s marginal revenue 
product. Marginal revenue productivity can be defined as the observed performance 
of the firm minus the performance of the firm with the next best alternative executive 
at the helm, plus the costs of acquiring the latter’s services (Gomez-Mejia, 1994). 
Under the basic market assumption that “competition on both sides of the [executive] 
labour market and a continuum of alternative jobs open to the executive and of 
executives available to the firm” (Roberts, 1956: 291), executive pay can be 
understood as the result of the value of the executive’s marginal revenue productivity. 
In equilibrium this is equal to the intersection of supply and demand on the market for 
executives. 
Based on this, human capital theory, the second theory in the value approach, argues 
that an executive’s productivity is influenced by his accumulated knowledge and 
skills, i.e. his human capital. The more knowledge and skills an executive has, the 
higher his human capital will be. An executive with a greater quantity of human 
capital would be better able to perform his job and thus be paid more. The market for 
executives determines the value of this capital (see for human capital approaches in 
the executive pay literature e.g. Agarwal, 1981; Carpenter, Sanders, and Gregersen, 
2001; Combs and Skill, 2003; Harris and Helfat, 1997). 
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The third theory, efficiency wage theory (Lazear, 1995; Prendergast, 1999), argues 
that executives will put in extra effort if they are promised an above-market-level 
wage. Because pay is set at a level above market level, executives are less likely to 
leave the firm or to shirk their work, and will feel their contributions to the firm are 
valuable. Executives subsequently have the incentive to put in extra effort, which 
reduces executive turnover and increases productivity (Balsam, 2002; Prendergast, 
1999). Executive pay is considered to be the result of the value of executive’s 
marginal revenue productivity plus a premium above market level to provide extra 
incentives. 
An opportunity cost approach, which is the fourth theory in this approach, argues that 
the transparency of job-openings on the executive labor market makes it possible for 
executives to change employers. The opportunity cost perspective argues that in order 
to hire or retain an executive the level of pay must at least be equal to the amount that 
would be paid to an executive for his next best alternative (Thomas, 2002; Gomez-
Mejia and Wiseman, 1997).  
The fifth theory is superstar theory (Rosen, 1981). Although Rosen (1981) does not 
specifically address the implications of this theory in regard to explanations of 
executive pay, the theory does address the skewness in the distribution of income. 
Following Rosen (1981), less talent is hardly a good substitute for more talent. And 
thus imperfect substitution among different “sellers” of talent exists. Given imperfect 
substitution, demand for the better talented increases disproportionately. If production 
costs do not rise in proportion to the size of the sellers market, it is argued that a 
concentration of output is possible. Economy of scale of joint consumption allows for 
relatively few sellers to service the entire market. Then again, fewer sellers are needed 
if these sellers are more capable of serving the entire market. When combining the 
joint consumption and the imperfect substitution features, it becomes apparent that 
talented persons can serve very large markets and subsequently receive large incomes 
(Rosen, 1981).  
The skew-ness in the distribution of executive pay could thus be explained by the 
disproportionate premiums that firms are willing to pay for executives’ talent or 
capabilities for which no good substitutes exist. Furthermore, albeit in relatively 
smaller proportions as indicated by Rosen (1981), the distribution of executive pay 
can be explained by possible joint consumption of executive services. The 
possibilities for better talented and/ or more capable executives to serve on (multiple) 
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boards implies that fewer executives are needed to serve the market, and that 
subsequently their pay would increase disproportionately.   
 
THE AGENCY APPROACH  
Rather than determining how much to pay executives, the central legitimizing issue in 
the agency approach is how to pay them (cf. Barkema, Geroski, and Schwalbach, 
1997; Jensen and Murphy, 1990a). Pay levels are in this approach mainly assumed to 
be based upon the market value of executives’ services. As pay is seen as a 
consequence of agency problems, the question how to pay the executive is the main 
issue addressed in these theories. Agency problems exist in any situation where one 
party entrusts responsibility of tasks to another party. In this agency approach a 
distinction can be made between two groups. Group 1 consists of theories that 
consider executive pay as a (partial) solution to overcome agency problems by 
incentive alignment and the transference of risks. Group 2 comprises of theories that 
consider pay as a result of executives’ discretionary powers resulting in turn from 
agency problems. The theories in the first group are the complete contract approach, 
referred to in the literature as agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and 
prospect theory. The second group consists of managerial power theory and class 
hegemony theory.  
 
Problems of agency are central in the corporate governance literature. Gomez-Mejia 
and Wiseman (1997) sum up three basic assumptions of a simple agency model. First, 
agents are risk averse, second, agents behave according to self-interest assumptions, 
and third, agents’ interests are not in line with the principals’ interests. Based on these 
assumptions they also identify two cases. The first is the case of complete information 
about agents’ actions. In this case no information asymmetries between principals and 
agents exist. Under these conditions the principal is completely aware of the agent’s 
actions. Providing the agent with additional incentives is unnecessary in this case, as 
the principal is completely aware of how results are achieved and would unnecessarily 
transfer risk to a risk averse agent.  
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The second case is when the principal has incomplete information on the agent’s 
behavior. In this case the principal is not completely aware when the agent deviates 
from the interests of the principal. In this case, agency problems could arise because 
of two factors. One is moral hazard, by e.g. shirking, and the other is adverse 
selection, by e.g. hubris actions. Agents can, for instance, be so involved in pursuing 
their own interests that they neglect their duties and/or overestimate their own 
capabilities. To solve these problems of incomplete information, the principal has two 
options. Either obtain (more) information about the agent’s efforts and behavior by 
increased monitoring, or provide the agent with incentives in a way that the interests 
of the principal and agent become aligned. By providing incentives, the risk of 
deviation from the interests of the principal is transferred back to the agent. Because 
the agent is assumed to be risk averse and maximizes his self interests, he is presumed 
to adhere to these incentives in a way that his behavior will result in an outcome that 
is preferable to the principal. The optimal pay package would minimize agency cost 
and  is a tradeoff between the costs of (additional) monitoring and incentives (Gomez-
Mejia and Wiseman, 1997). To minimize residual losses for the principal, problems of 
optimal risk-bearing from the agent’s point of view and optimal incentives from the 
principal’s point of view are conflicting in the design of executive pay (Eisenhardt 
1989, Rajagopalan 1996).  
 
The central issue of agency problems has developed into two groups of approaches 
within the agency approach on executive pay (cf. Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker 2002). 
The first group consists of complete contracting and prospect theory. The complete 
contracting approach (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) is the most prominent one in 
academic research on executive pay and is most often simply referred to as “agency 
theory”. Both theories in this group consider executive pay as a “tool” with which to 
alleviate agency problems.  
The second group in the agency approach is managerial power theory and class 
hegemony theory. These theories (convincingly) argue that because of principal agent 
relationships, agents are in the natural position to have discretion in setting their own 
pay (cf. Bratton, 2005; Jensen and Murphy, 2004).   
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Complete contract theory is classified as the first theory in group 1 (see table 1). As 
this theory is by far the dominant theory in the executive pay literature Bebchuk and 
Fried (2004) labeled it as “the official story” on executive pay. The central issue of 
the optimal contract problem is formulated by Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman as: “the 
tradeoff between the cost of measuring agent behavior and the cost of transferring risk 
to the agent, that is, balancing the insurance and incentive properties of compensation 
design” (1997: 296). Basically the theory argues that executive pay is a “tool” with 
which to align the interests of executives with that of shareholders. By arms’ length 
negotiations, a contract with the right incentives is made up that transfers risks to a 
risk averse executive. In a simple model of this theory one could argue that what 
setting executive pay really comes down to is the incentives that are needed to bring a 
risk averse executive’s interests and behavioral outcomes in line with the expectations 
and interests of the shareholder. Typically, the contract is made up between the board 
of directors, as representatives of the shareholders, and management. Pay levels are 
based on the market value of executive’s services and pay structures are based on the 
necessary incentives from the shareholders’ point of view to uphold the perfect 
contract following given levels of monitoring. The outcome based complete contract 
is made up based on efficiency arguments and is the most efficient tradeoff between 
different types of agency costs that minimize residual losses for shareholders (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976).  
The second theory in group 1 of the agency approach is prospect theory and is based 
on the same agency problem. In contrast to the complete contract approach which is 
based on risk aversion assumptions, prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) 
uses loss aversion assumptions. Building on prospect theory and on agency theories, 
Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia (1998) formulated a behavioral agency model of risk 
taking. Their approach argues that prospect and agency theories are complementary 
and, by combining internal corporate governance with problem framing, help to 
explain executive risk-taking behavior (Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). The 
theory argues that the executive is willing to take risks under certain circumstances, 
i.e. to avoid losses or missing goals or targets. The executive is unwilling to take risks 
once he has received his performance goals, as the benefit to the executive of 
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increasing performance is more than offset by the possibility of falling below target 
(Balsam, 2002). In this theory, wealth maximization is a less accurate explanation for 
executives’ decisions making preferences than a loss minimization perspective. 
Executive decisions are argued to generally seek to limit losses to wealth while also 
increasing opportunity costs (Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Influences from 
prospect theory on executive pay could be brought back to a loss aversion perspective 
on executive behavior. Strategic decision making and governance mechanisms have 
effects on executive risk bearing and thereby affect the executives’ perceived risk of 
his wealth. Setting executive pay is thus a result of the amount of risk bearing of 
executive’s wealth. Governance arrangements, such as monitoring mechanisms, and 
implications of risk levels, risk shifting, and risk sharing, determine the pay of a loss 
averse executive (See Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998).   
 
Group 2 of the agency approach consists of managerial power theory and class 
hegemony theory. The separation between ownership and control has resulted in 
conditions where the interests between owners and executives can diverge and the 
checks to limit the use of power (from owners as well as ultimate managers) can 
disappear (Berle and Means, 1932/2004). The relative balance of power between the 
principals and agents are argued to influence the outcome of the contract and 
therefore influence the level and structure of executive pay. The managerial power 
approach to agency problems does not exclusively see pay design as a “tool” to 
alleviate agency problems. Managerial power theory argues that because of principal-
agent relations, agents are in the natural position to use their discretion to set their 
own pay. Pay design is not a solution to agency problems but is seen as part of the 
same problem; it is an agency problem in itself (Bebchuk et al., 2002). Executives are 
in the position to use their power to influence those decision making authorities  
especially designed to keep them in check (i.e. the board of directors; Fama, 1980; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983). In contrast to the complete contracting theory, natural 
relationships between principals and agents and the consequent possible use of 
discretion are considered as real possible behavior (Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-
Mejia, 2002). In the perfect contract approach, discretion is effectively ruled out, as 
managers are expected to behave according to the contract, because of the incentives 
they receive for upholding this contract. In this sense, discretion is not considered as a 
possible behavior, but only as a cost (Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia, 2002). 
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Managerial power theory argues that executive pay is an outcome of power 
relationships and that pay setters and pay receivers are able to use discretion in the 
pay setting process.  
A theory that extends managerial power theory is class hegemony theory. This theory 
argues that executives within a firm and executives from other firms share a 
commonality of interests. Where managerial power theory stops at the boundaries of 
firms, class hegemony theory extends managerial views beyond these boundaries 
(Gomez-Mejia, 1994). Shared interests and objectives create bonds between 
executives that extend beyond a single organization. These bonds form relationships 
which in turn form a class across different organizations. By using (shared) power the 
executives can protect their privileges and the wealth of their class. Although 
primarily executives’ input is used to legitimize high executive pay, setting high pay 
is also a token of executives’ power to protect shared interests and objectives 
(Gomez-Mejia, 1994). Setting executive pay is thus a result of the social managerial 
class’s power to protect their interests and objectives that are at potential risk.  
 
THE SYMBOLIC APPROACH  
The third approach to legitimizing executive pay comprises of theories that consider 
pay more as a social constructed symbol fitting the expectation, status, or role that 
executives play in a society or firm. Executive pay has a primary role in reflecting 
executive status, dignity, and expectations and plays a more secondary role in 
executive motivation. The legitimizing arguments are based on social (or social-
economical) constructed beliefs about executive roles and how pay ought to reflect 
this. The symbolic approach consists of the following 7 theories: 1) tournament 
theory, 2) figurehead theory, 3) stewardship theory, 4) crowding-out theory, 5) 
implicit/ psychological contract theory, 6) social enacted proportionality theory, and 
7) social comparison theory. 
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Tournament theory (Lazear and Rosen, 1981) treats pay as a prize in a contest. First 
prize in the tournament is the highest pay received by the CEO, the highest-ranking 
position in an organization. Setting a high prize provides incentives for the contestants 
to climb higher on the corporate ladder (Rosen, 1986) and indirectly increases the 
productivity of competitors at lower levels (Balsam, 2002). Although high levels of 
executive pay also provide executives themselves with incentives, they serve more as 
incentives for their subordinates (Balsam, 2002). When the top price is set at a 
disproportionately high level it has the effect of lengthening the career ladder of high-
ranking managers (O’reilly, Main, and Crystal, 1988). “Contestants who succeed in 
attaining high ranks in elimination career ladders rest on their laurels in attempting to 
climb higher, unless top-ranking prizes are given a disproportionate weight in the 
purse. A large first-place prize gives survivors something to shoot for, independent of 
past performances and accomplishments” (Rosen, 1986: 701). The symbols needed to 
keep the tournament going result in highly differing pay levels at the different levels 
in the organization, with a disproportionately high first place for achieving the top 
position.  
Figurehead theory argues that behavior is assumed to reflect purpose or intention and 
that a diversity of goals and interests co-exist within firms (Ungson and Steers 1984). 
Because of these different, possibly conflicting, goals and interest “actions and 
decisions result from bargaining and compromise, with those units with the greatest 
power receiving the greatest rewards from the interplay of organisational politics” 
(Ungson and Steers, 1984: 316). Three perspectives of executives roles can be 
identified (Ungson and Steers, 1984). First, executives act as “boundary-spanners” for 
owners, governments, employees and the general public. In this regard executives, 
and especially the CEO, play political/symbolic figurehead roles when 
communicating within and outside the firm. Second, the executive manages political 
coalitions within and outside the firm and plays the role of political strategist. And 
third, the executive plays the role of internal politician in the relationship between 
members of the board of directors when new directors are hired and executive pay is 
set (Ungson and Steers, 1984). Because of the different roles that managers play and 
represent, the “appropriate role for the manager may be [that of an] evangelist” 
(Weick, 1979: 42). As a reflection of these different roles executive pay is set by the 
individual’s ability to manage the complexity of the symbolic political roles and is 
used as a token of the executive’s mandate. The makeup of the pay mix depends on 
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the complexity of these roles and accommodates political processes in the best interest 
of the firm (Ungson and Steers, 1984). Executive pay is part of the status the 
executive has within and outside the firm and is intended to reinforce this figurehead 
image (Gomez-Mejia, 1994).  
The third theory in the symbolic approach is stewardship theory. Stewardship theory 
argues a contradicting view on governance (Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson, 1997; 
Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Stewardship theory does not provide a-priori clear 
hypotheses about pay levels or pay structures and could therefore be questioned as a 
useful theory to legitimize executive pay. Nevertheless, stewardship views are 
addressed because the theory does attempt to explain that executive pay does not have 
to be (strongly) related to shareholder wealth or other measures of the firm’s financial 
performance (Davis, Schoorman, Donaldson, 1997). Using sociological and 
psychological approaches, stewardship theory sees subordinates as collectivists, pro-
organizational and trustworthy as opposed to e.g. agency theory, which assume 
subordinates to be individualistic, opportunistic, and self-serving (see Donaldson 
1995). Stewardship theory defines situations in which managers’ motives are aligned 
with the objectives of their principals, rather than motives of individual goals (Davis, 
Schoorman, Donaldson, 1997). Executives are motivated to act in the best interest of 
their principals and the firm (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Even in situations where 
the interests of stewards and principals diverge, Davis et al. (1997) argue that 
stewards place higher value on co-operation and thus perceive greater utility in co-
operative behavior. Stewardship theory assumes a strong relation between the firm’s 
success and principal satisfaction. The theory argues that there is no general executive 
motivation problem, because executives act as true stewards of the firm, in pursuit of 
organizational goals. Executive pay plays a secondary role in executive motivation, 
because non-financial rewards are of more importance (Donaldson et al., 1991). The 
theory focuses more on intrinsic, rather than extrinsic rewards. Executives are 
intrinsically motivated by the need to achieve and to receive recognition from others 
(Donaldson et al., 1991). Executive pay could be legitimized by arguing that it is 
merely a relatively minor part of executive motivation and forms only part of the 
recognition executives receive for being stewards of the firm.   
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Extending on the balance of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, crowding-out theory 
argues that monetary incentives can crowd-out intrinsic motivation and thereby also 
good intentions (Frey, 1997a; 1997b). Pay plays a part of executive motivation, but 
intrinsic motivation to pursue organizational goals is likely more important. There is a 
delicate balance between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Pay levels that are too 
high or the provision of too many extrinsic incentives could drive out intrinsic 
motivation, resulting in lower efforts by the executives. In turn, high pay levels and 
high incentives could result in behavior that pursues goals that are not in line with the 
best interests of the firm (e.g. corporate fraud) (Frey and Osterlőh, 2005). Executive 
pay plays a secondary role in executive motivation. A higher level of intrinsic 
motivation from executives requires lower pay levels and fewer incentives to balance 
intrinsic motivation with extrinsic motivation.  
The fifth theory in the symbolic approach is implicit contract or psychological 
contract theory (see e.g. Rosen, 1985; Kidder and Buchholtz, 2002; Baker, Gibbons, 
and Murphy, 2002). This theory argues that a contract exists between an individual 
and another party that is composed of the individual’s beliefs about the nature of the 
exchange agreement. Based on social exchange theory, relational contract theory 
tends to rely on principles of generalized reciprocity. The psychological contract is an 
individual’s personal set of reciprocal expectations of his obligations and entitlements 
which do not necessarily have to be mutually agreed upon between the contractors 
(Kidder and Buchholtz, 2002). In this respect Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (2002) use 
the term relational contracts. Baker et al. (2002) argue that a relational contract is 
composed of informal agreements and unwritten codes of conduct that affect 
individuals’ behavior. The relationship contract is based on trust and the common 
beliefs of the parties regarding fairness and sense of justice. The job characteristics of 
executives and the nature of their positions create a relational psychological contract. 
Pay is seen as a symbol that reflects appreciation, accomplishment, and dignity 
(Kidder and Buchholtz, 2002). 
The sixth theory is referred to here as the socially enacted proportionality theory. This 
theory argues that the value of an executive is the result of positions of different ranks 
within a firm. Simon argues that executive pay is “determined by requirements of 
internal “consistency” of the salary scale with the formal organization and by norms 
of proportionality between salaries of executives and their subordinates” (1957: 34). 
Because of hierarchical structures induced by authority relations, large organizations 
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are roughly pyramidal shaped. Furthermore, it is widely (socially) accepted that 
executives and their immediate subordinates have different salaries. This line of 
arguing can be followed down to the lowest organizational level where employees are 
hired outside the firm, e.g. school graduates. Salaries at this level are set by forces of 
market competition. The socially enacted norm of proportionality determines the ratio 
of an executive salary and the salaries of his immediate subordinates (Simon, 1957). 
According to the socially enacted proportionality theory, executive pay is the result of 
socially normative proportional differences between socially enacted hierarchical 
levels within firms, with a market-based pay at the lowest level.  
The seventh theory of the symbolic approach is social comparison theory. This theory 
is also based on comparison but comparison is made at the top level of the firm and 
with executives externally to the organization. With the help of Goodman (1974) and 
Festinger’s (1954) theories of social comparison processes, which in turn are related 
to equity theory, O’Reilly, Main, and Crystal (1988) argue that executives use their 
own pay as a reference point when setting the pay of other executives. This theory 
originates from the argument that people have the drive to evaluate their abilities and 
options. People tend to use other people with similar performances and/or ideas to 
themselves when selecting reference points. People preferably compare themselves 
with others who are seen as slightly better or more expert than themselves. In the case 
of setting executive pay, executives rely on normative judgments of their own pay and 
experience and on judgments of the experience and pay of other executives (Gomez-
Mejia, 1994; O’Reilly et al., 1988). Executive pay reflects normative judgments of 
other executives and in this sense serves a function of symbolic judgment. 
 
 
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE APPROACHES 
As also indicated by Gomez-Mejia (1994), many empirical studies test hypotheses 
derived from a variety of theoretical models. The (often contradictory) results of these 
studies have implications for more than one theory. The still ongoing debate about a 
link between pay and performance is a case in point (cf. Rosen, 1990). Where some 
argue that the link is not strong enough to support incentive (alignment) arguments, 
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others argue that the link at least exists and would show support for these type of 
theoretical implications (Gomez-Mejia, 1994; Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 1997; 
Jensen and Murphy, 1990b). Overall, empirical studies on the determinants of 
executive pay lack theoretical foundations and show a rather weak fit with the data 
(Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1995; Mueller and Yun, 1997)2. Subsequently, scholars’ 
known biases and  ideological orientation often serve as the best predictors of the 
findings presented (Gomez-Mejia, 1994; Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 1997) 3.  
 
Although the theoretical (behavioral) assumptions of the theories are at times 
fundamentally different, the implications of the different theories provide more 
insights than each theory would provide on its own. The question that arises is how 
the different approaches as set out above can be useful to provide more conclusive 
explanations for executive pay, and by that provide a better understanding of the 
legitimization of executive pay in theory and in practice (cf. Gomez-Mejia and 
Wiseman, 1997; Wade, Porac, and Pollock, 1997; Zajac and Westphal 1995).  
  
Central roles for economic reasoning, pricing and market mechanisms are apparent in 
the value and agency approaches on executive pay. These theories argue that market 
forces could form a solid basis for explaining executive pay. When adhering to 
arguments of market forces explaining known variance between executive pay levels 
and structures, also across countries, ultimately lie in addressing market imperfections 
(cf. Abowd and Kaplan, 1999; Conyon and Murphy, 2000). The value approach 
contributes to our understanding of how economic theories could help to explain 
                                                 
 
 
2 See for overviews of determinants and empirical studies e.g. Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 1997; 
Murphy, 1999; Tosi, Werner, Katz and Gomez-Mejia, 2000). 
3 It could be argued that the dominant use of the perfect contracting approach of agency theory in the 
executive pay literature has become “institutionalized” as scholar’s wide spread use of  this theory has 
evolved as the standard, or “official story” (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004), when explaining executive pay. 
This development has led us into a “blind alley” (Barkema and Gomez-Mejia, 1998) resulting in 
limited attention to explore other (possible more fruitful) ways to explain the social phenomenon of 
executive pay in theory and legitimization of executive pay in practice.      
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differences in pay between executives and between executives and other employees. It 
could further be helpful in signaling possible market inefficiencies or market 
outcomes under certain conditions of market inefficiencies. Legitimizing executive 
pay exclusively based on efficient market assumptions is however problematic. As 
also made clear from the theories in the agency approach, the actual decision making 
process within the firm is of importance. Markets cannot decide on anything and 
provide only signals to inform the decision making process (cf. Cyert and March, 
1963/1992; Kay, 2000). Markets are simply not strong enough to completely 
influence efficient decision making on executive pay. Incomplete information about 
firms’ hiring practices and available executives and about the assessment of 
executives’ capabilities across the globe causes problems with regard to the 
legitimization of executive pay based solely on market and pricing mechanisms 
(Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1988; Perkins and Hendry, 2005).  
The theories in the agency approach argue that the fundamental issue is the agency 
problem between shareholders and management. In these theories pay is argued to 
depend on market values and optimal levels of risks of executive wealth (Gomez-
Mejia, 1994). Extending the solid economic theories of the value approach, the 
agency approach highlights the importance to address other mechanisms besides 
markets that influence the level of risk. An important insight is that monitoring, risk 
sharing and the transfer of wealth at risk are important to set executive pay. In 
general, efficient executive pay is argued to be set as a tradeoff between the cost of 
steering behavior by incentives and the cost associated with monitoring and bonding. 
The important central mechanisms of monitoring are often thought of as mechanisms 
operated by the board of directors (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). The theories 
in the agency approach allow for investigating the crucial role this and other 
monitoring mechanisms play in the design of executive pay (cf. Michael and Pearce, 
2004). The legitimization of pay is nevertheless still based on implications of market 
forces, but the agency approach extends this approach by pointing out the crucial role 
of pay design and the relationships between principals and agents. A second important 
insight from the second group of theories in the agency approach is that executives 
have discretionary power to influence corporate governance outcomes and the ability 
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not to adhere to market signals. Executives can influence the board of directors and 
the pay setting process. They are in the position to influence the board of directors 
when negotiating their own pay. The insight that executives could be seen as a social 
class, as indicated by class hegemony theory, emphasizes the notion that the relative 
balance of power in societies of different classes could influence corporate 
governance arrangements and their outcomes in, for instance, certain pay levels and 
structures. 
 
Especially apparent in the dominant perfect contract approach, but also in many other 
economic theories on executive pay, individuals are most often reduced to a set of 
“ontological actors, frozen in space and time and isolated from social and cultural 
context” (Aquilera and Jackson, 2003; 449). In the ex-ante perfect contracting view of 
agency theory, the designer of the contract has to anticipate all future possible 
problems that clearly exist ex-post (Zingales, 1998). As complete contracts are simply 
not possible in practice, other mechanisms have to be in place to resolve problems 
regarding (mis)use of discretion. This problem becomes apparent especially when we 
have to admit that executives have discretion over their own pay arrangements (cf. 
Bratton, 2005; Jensen and Murphy, 2004). Not only checks and balances outside the 
firm, such as social, political or legal institutions play a role in organizing corporate 
governance arrangements, but also firm internal checks and balances such as the 
board of directors and other employees play a role. Other mechanisms inside and 
outside the firm are clearly at play in solving or alleviating agency problems. Other 
mechanisms besides explicit contracts and markets have to be in place to alleviate 
problems of incomplete contracting and determining over the (mis)use of executives’ 
discretionary powers ( cf. Williamson, 1988; Zingales 1998).  
By the dominant use of the perfect contracting approach of agency theory the 
executive pay literature most often neglects these mechanisms and implications. The 
literature neglects the “social embeddedness” (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1997) in 
accounts of executive pay.  This embeddedness plays however a central role in the 
symbolic approach. The symbolic approach relies heavily on socially constructed 
normative inclined beliefs (especially apparent in the implicit contracting theory) of 
how executive pay ought to look, rather than on market forces. In tournament theory, 
for instance, the level of pay is most likely set above the contributed value of the 
executive’s services in order to increase the efforts and productivity of lower level 
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employees (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). Executive pay is, however, set at some kind of 
normative level that provides enough incentives for lower level employees to believe 
that they must take part in and do their best to win the tournament. The legitimization 
of executive pay relies thus on the symbolic value of a prize that is big enough to start 
the tournament and to keep it going.  
The arguments in the symbolic approach are based on the concept of pay as a symbol 
of accomplishment, good stewardship, dignity, normative judgments of reverence 
points, status, mandate, normative socially accepted proportionality, and reflections of 
a delicate balance between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. They rely on arguments 
of legitimizing pay levels and structures on socially inclined beliefs and arguments 
about the informational value executive pay carries. Although economic reasoning of 
market forces may play (a small) part (e.g. socially enacted proportionality theory 
considers pay at the lowest level of the firm to be based on market value) or may 
influence the results (e.g. by implicit contracting it could be argued that in a relatively 
bigger and/ or better performing firm there may be higher (valued) expectations with 
regard to executive capabilities than in a smaller or more poorly performing firm), 
market forces are not explicitly considered the most determining factor for the setting 
of executive pay. Although market forces could influence decision making on 
executive pay, the symbolic approach focuses on the social construction of pay levels 
and structures. The answer to the question how and how much to pay executives is 
rooted here in the degree of social acceptance or “appropriateness” (cf. Cyert and 
March 1963/1992) of given pay arrangements. Decisions on executive pay are made 
and legitimized by referring to pay as simply being “appropriate” are “legitimate”, 
given the contextual positions of the actors involved and given the perceived position, 
role, status, expectations, standards of comparison, and intrinsic (non-priced) 
motivation of being an executive. 
 
Despite the so far blurred sketched status of the literature the growing notion is that 
studies that consider executive pay solely as a “tool” that provides (the right) 
incentives have been shown to be inconstant with theory and with each other (Tosi, 
Werner, Katz, and Gomez-Mejia, 2000). Views that consider executive pay as a 
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“tool” have lost ground because they have to admit that executives have discretion in 
negotiating their own pay arrangements (Bratton, 2005). This seems to have led even 
former prominent proponents of this view to reconsider their views and shift in the 
direction of considering executive pay as an outcome of practices developed by the 
interactions of different corporate governance mechanisms. Jensen and Murphy 
(2004) are among these former prominent proponents who nowadays argue in this 
direction. The apparent recent consensus of considering executive pay as an outcome 
of pay setting practices further deepens and fuels the idea of socially constructed 
corporate governance arrangements that influence pay levels and makeup. Although 
the apparent recent consensus indicates that the time seems ripe to formulate an 
integrated approach, attempts to integrate different approaches are not new. Previous 
frameworks are, for instance, from Barkema and Gomez-Mejia (1998), Finkelstein 
and Hambrick (1988), Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (1997). The seemingly growing 
consensus, as also reflected by these integrating frameworks, ads to the idea that the 
executive pay setting process is influenced by socially constructed corporate 
governance arrangements over which executives can exercise their discretion (cf. 
Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Bratton, 2005, Jensen and Murphy 2004, Otten, 2007). 
Moreover, in the corporate governance literature increased attention goes out to the 
social construction and practicality of corporate governance systems (e.g. Aquilera 
and Jackson, 2003; Gordon and Roe, 2004; Heugens and Otten, 2007; Perkins and 
Hendry, 2005; Roe, 2003). Corporate governance arrangements and their outcomes 
are increasingly considered to be results of social action (cf. Becht, Bolton, and Roëll, 
2002; Davis and Thompson, 1994; Guilén, 2000; Heugens and Otten, 2007; Roe, 
2003). In the executive pay literature, however, still very little attention has been paid 
to the social construction of pay setting practices. Due to the dominant use of the 
perfect contracting approach of agency theory, which in the limited rules out their 
influence (cf Zingales, 1998), institutional evolved conditions are hardly considered. 
Most often overlooked in the executive pay literature is the risk of “under 
socialization” (Granovetter, 1985) when providing accounts of executive pay. 
Incorporating socially constructed arrangements(i.e. institutions) in accounts of 
executive pay could provide much-needed additional insights into how corporate 
governance and pay setting practices operate under different institutional conditions 
(cf. Aquilera and Jackson, 2003; Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Tosi and Greckhamer, 
2004). The problem of under socialization becomes especially apparent when 
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considering that most empirical research on executive pay uses US data. 
Generalizations of theories  and conclusions of these tests, imply that the US example 
is considered to be the worldwide standard. However, well-known variances between 
executive pay levels and makeup across countries indicate that the US case, with its 
relatively very high pay levels and large proportions of pay components that are 
potentially contingent on performance, is more of an outlier than the worldwide 
standard (see e.g. Abowd and Bogananno, 1995; Kaplan, 1994; Conyon and Murphy, 
2000; Murphy, 1999; Otten, 2007 for examples of large cross-country differences in 
pay levels and makeup). Thereby certain pay setting practices may be present in 
certain jurisdictions but not in others. Take for instance the presence of employee 
representation on the board of directors in large listed German firms, a feature not 
known in for instance the UK or the US. The very few studies that do incorporate 
institutional settings in empirical tests or in exploring conclusive accounts of 
executive pay, clearly indicate that such an approach could be very useful to provide 
more conclusive explanations (e.g. Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Jensen and Murphy, 
2004; Tosi and Greckhamer, 2004; Otten, 2007).  
An important theoretical implication of such a view is to consider executive pay as an 
outcome of pay setting practices rather then as a tool within these practices. Pay 
setting practices, defined as those firm level processes that serve to set, compare, and 
implement pay levels and structures, can be understood as being part of more broadly 
defined corporate governance arrangements. Both the pay setting practices and the 
corporate governance arrangements in which they are embedded, are developed and 
contested by developments in societies at large (cf. e.g. Agquilera and Jackson, 2003; 
Otten; 2007; Perkins and Hendry, 2005; Roe, 2003). The seemingly recent consensus 
in the literature that executives can exercise their discretion in shaping the pay setting 
process and subsequently can influence their pay levels and makeup, together with the 
growing notion from the corporate governance literature that corporate governance 
systems are socially constructed, provide a more integrated account of observable 
executive pay in practice. In this way executive pay can be understood as an outcome 
of firm level processes that are embedded in socially constructed corporate 
governance arrangements that can vary across countries, between firms and over time. 
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Individuals can hold different positions of influence in the pay setting process and 
may hold different opinions, expectations, notions, and perceptions (cf. Jepperson, 
1991) about appropriate levels and structures of executive pay for a given firm. 
Individual influences and attitudes on the firm’s institutional environment, firm’s 
processes, and thus on national and firm level corporate governance arrangements, 
provide a more conclusive explanation of observable executive in practice. 
Subsequently it provides a more conclusive explanation of the ongoing debate on 
executive pay as a social phenomenon.  
CONCLUSION 
The overview of theories on executive pay presented here has addressed 16 different 
theories. Classifying these theories is problematic. The different theories are 
overlapping and contradictory at the same time. The theories are also at risk of being 
oversimplified. Even so, based on the underlying main legitimizing arguments of the 
theories, an assessment is made of their usefulness for explaining executive pay levels 
and makeup. The differences in the theories with regard to their focuses for 
legitimizing arguments and the roles they give to pay resulted in a classification of 3 
approaches; 1) the value approach, 2) the agency approach, and 3) the symbolic 
approach. The focuses of these approaches are regarding questions of how much to 
pay, how to pay, and what pay ought to represent or reflect, respectively. 
The value approach main arguments for legitimizing executive pay are based upon 
market mechanisms and market forces. The main contribution of this value approach 
is the insight it provides into how economic theory can contribute to a general 
understanding of markets and market inefficiencies in determining executive pay. 
This approach is, however, less capable of providing irrefutable explanations for 
executive pay when addressing the question how decisions on pay are made. The 
value approach is incapable of providing explanations regarding questions around 
actual decisions on executive pay within a framework of corporate governance that at 
the same time address how corporate governance arrangements are organized within 
and outside firms.  
The theories that comprise the agency approach, clearly indicate the importance of 
corporate governance arrangements at national and firm levels. Governance problems 
such as problems of agency, (ex-post) bargaining over (quasi-) rents and governing 
transactions indicate the need for corporate governance mechanisms. However, the 
  
 
 
 
 
26
complete contracting view of the firm is too narrow and result in the inability to raise 
questions about the centralized institutional configurations in which a perfect contract  
is made up. A power based view, one of the two sub-streams in the agency approach, 
indicates that power relationships between the actors involved influence both the pay 
setting practices and their outcomes. This approach, however, still mainly considers 
the firm as a nexus of explicit contracts. This is turn results in a conceptual problem 
regarding questions about the hierarchical structure within firms and the implications 
for corporate governance arrangements. According to the agency approach, 
explaining and hereby legitimizing executive pay is based on 1) the implication that 
executive pay is subject to risks and 2) possible discretionary powers of the actors 
involved. 
The symbolic approach provides additional insights into the concept of pay as a social 
phenomenon. Decisions on pay in this approach are based on an institutional 
approach. The symbol of certain pay levels and structures reflects the contextual role 
of an executive in the firm and/or in society. At the same time, and possibly also 
problematic within this approach, is the normative inclined social construction of pay 
levels and makeup. The normative inclinations in this approach point out the 
problems of legitimizing executive pay in practice. Nevertheless, positive theoretical 
(economic) arguments play a background role in these theories. The legitimization of 
executive pay in this approach is based on arguments that address socially (or social-
economically) normative constructed beliefs. The symbols that pay represents reflect 
the social belief of what is “appropriate” to pay an executive and what the executive 
role constitutes.  
Most often overlooked in the executive pay literature, and especially in empirical 
studies, is the acquired notion that institutions influence and are influenced by 
decisions on executive pay. A more conclusive explanation of executive pay seems to 
rely on considering executive pay to be an outcome of pay setting practices. Pay 
setting practices, those firm level processes that serve to set, compare, and implement 
pay levels and structures, can differ from firm to firm and from country to country. 
Social configurations of tangible and intangible institutions co-determine corporate 
governance arrangements in which pay setting practices play a central role. Such an 
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approach enables to incorporate socially constructed corporate governance 
arrangements in accounts of executive pay. It captures the apparent consensus in the 
literature that executive pay is an outcome of institutionally evolved corporate 
governance arrangements, rather than a tool within these arrangements. The 
comparative corporate governance literature suggests that the relative balance of 
power in society determines the configuration of institutions that influence how 
corporate governance arrangements function and how they develop (e.g. Roe, 2003). 
The seemingly consensus in theorizing on executive pay furthermore points out that 
executives have discretion over their pay setting practices and can influence their own 
pay levels and structures and that of others. In contrast to the dominant use of the 
perfect contracting approach, the executive pay literature seems to be hading into the 
direction of considering executive pay as an outcome of pay setting practices, 
embedded in socially constructed corporate governance arrangements over which the 
actors involved can influence their institutionally constructed discretion.    
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Table 1 
Executive pay and theoretical approaches 
Value approach Agency approach Symbolic approach 
 
Theory Role of Pay Theory Role of Pay  Theory Role of Pay 
 
Marginal 
Productivity 
Theory 
 
Value of input 
equal to marginal 
revenue 
productivity; 
equal to 
equilibrium on 
market  
 
Complete 
Contract 
Theory 
(Group 1) 
 
Overcome 
incentive 
misalignment; 
based on risk 
preferences  
 
Tournament 
Theory 
 
Highest price in 
a contest, 
motivation for 
lower level 
employees 
Efficiency 
wage 
Theory 
Idem Marginal 
Productivity plus 
incentive to 
increase 
productivity and 
reduce turnover  
Prospect 
Theory 
(Group 1) 
Incentive 
alignment 
caused by loss 
aversion 
preferences  
Figurehead 
Theory 
Token of 
executive’s 
mandate and as 
accomplishment 
Human 
Capital 
Theory 
Value of 
capabilities and 
skills on the 
market 
Managerial 
Theory 
(Group 2) 
Exhibit of 
power when 
negotiating 
contract  
Stewardship 
Theory 
Secondary, 
intrinsic 
motivation is of 
more 
importance 
Opportunity 
Cost Theory 
The opportunity 
cost of next best 
alternative for 
the executive 
Class 
Hegemony 
Theory 
(Group 2) 
Use of power 
and protection 
of managerial 
class 
Crowding-out 
Theory 
Part of extrinsic 
motivation 
Superstar 
Theory 
Disproportionate 
pay for imperfect 
substitution  
  Socially Enacted 
Proportionality 
Theory 
Result of 
socially 
normative 
proportion 
differences of 
socially enacted 
hierarchical 
levels 
    Social 
Comparison 
Theory 
Based on pay of 
comparable 
executives.  
Likely above 
going rate of 
benchmark  
    Implicit / 
Psychological 
Contract Theory 
Symbol of 
appreciation, 
accomplishment 
and dignity 
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